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American wars have had a considerable toll on the 
civilian populations of the countries they have been waged in. 
The best estimate of civilian deaths directly caused by coalition 
forces in The Iraq War is 11,516, which is three times higher 
than the deaths of coalition forces and accounts for 33% of 
Iraqi deaths in the war.48 The American public, however, is not 
particularly concerned by these casualties. American casualties 
play a far larger role in determining public support for wars, 
despite the fact that these are often much lower than civilian 
casualties (as seen in the figures above).49 
Such partiality is to be expected, but the indifference 
to civilian casualties should be meliorated for two reasons. 
Concern for civilian casualties is good from a moral-epistemic 
standpoint, insofar as these casualties are morally concerning. 
Many of these wars are partly justified by the aim of improving 
these civilians’ lives, hence their deaths at the hands of 
US forces are deeply unjust. I cannot explore this complex 
question further, so I will assume that more concern for civilian 
casualties than the indifference currently displayed is a moral-
epistemic improvement. These moral-epistemic improvements 
can in turn lead to political improvements. The public becoming 
more aware that civilian casualties are morally troubling might 
lead to greater public outcry about them, which might in turn 
lead to changes in foreign policy and military strategy that 
reduce civilian casualties.
48  Bruce Cronin, Bugsplat: The politics of Collateral Damage in 
Western Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 17.
49  John Tirman, The Deaths of Others: The Fate of Civilians in 
America’s Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 339; Cronin, 
Bugsplat, 17.
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In this essay, I will explore the nature of Americans’ 
insensitivity and propose strategies for meliorating it. I will 
argue that the epistemic structures it is rooted in and the fact 
that Americans are not aware that they are insensitive mean 
that certain strategies are particularly effective in combatting 
Americans’ insensitivity. In the first section, I will outline the 
social-epistemological terms that will be applied to Americans’ 
insensitivity - meta-blindness, meta-attitudes, and social 
imaginaries. Meta-blindness is José Medina’s term for the 
phenomenon whereby insensitive subjects are unaware that 
they are insensitive.50 In the second section, I will apply these 
concepts to international relations scholar John Tirman’s 
analysis of Americans’ insensitivity to civilian casualties. I will 
argue that two causes Tirman identifies, orientalism and the 
frontier myth, are dominant social imaginaries. Another cause, 
orientalist knowledge hierarchies, are meta-attitudes. I will 
argue that this implies that American citizens are blind to their 
insensitivity, something Tirman doesn’t identify. 
In the third section, I will outline the implications of 
this analysis for how insensitivity to civilian casualties must 
be combatted. I will argue that combatting this insensitivity 
requires something beyond pointing out that certain attitudes 
are insensitive or presenting sensitive attitudes. Specifically, 
it requires targeting meta-blindness and the background 
epistemic structures of orientalism and the frontier myth. I 
will argue that since these background epistemic structures are 
dominant social imaginaries and meta-attitudes, they should be 
challenged from different imaginaries and meta-attitudes that 
Americans can access. Meta-blindness should be combatted by 
engendering the comparison of different epistemic perspectives.
1. Meta-Blindness, Meta-Attitudes, and Social Imaginaries
This section will outline the paper’s governing social-
epistemological framework. I will first outline the sense in 
which emotions are epistemic attitudes. I will then explain what 
Medina means by the term meta-blindness, and set out what 
will be meant by the terms “insensitivity”, “concern”, and their 
antonyms throughout the paper. Finally, I will outline what 
meta-attitudes and social imaginaries are.
50  José Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial 
Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 75.
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Because Americans have both beliefs and emotions 
about civilian casualties, it is important to clarify the epistemic 
significance of emotions. I cannot treat these issues in detail, 
but will briefly justify the claim that emotions are epistemic 
attitudes because they serve as reasons for belief. I will 
assume that the perception theory of emotions (which I will 
outline shortly) is correct. It is an example of a theory which 
sees emotions as involving what D’Arms and Jacobson call 
“evaluative presentations” of their objects, and theories of 
this kind are currently the majority view in the philosophy of 
emotion.51 Analogous arguments to those made in this paper 
could be made assuming any other evaluative presentation 
theory. 52
Christine Tappolet claims that emotions are perceptual 
experiences of an evaluative property, such as fearsomeness or 
admirability, in their object.53 If I fear a plant then I perceptually 
experience fearsomeness in it. Such perceptions can be fitting 
or unfitting depending on whether the object possesses the 
property in question.54 Fear of a lion is fitting, while fear of 
a sunflower is not. Perceptual experiences do not undertake 
epistemic commitments – I can perceptually experience a plant 
51  Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Moralistic Fallacy: On 
the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 61, no. 1 (2000): 66. Scarantino and de Sousa, in a review article, 
claim “The dominant view on emotions is that they are representations 
of… formal objects” (Andrea Scarantino and Ronald de Sousa, “Emotion,” 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), edited 
by Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/
emotion). See Daniel D. Hutto, “Truly Enactive Emotion,” Emotion Review 
4, no. 2 (2012): 179, for a contrary, non-representational view of emotions.
52  This is because all evaluative presentation theories can 
accommodate the idea that emotions are epistemic attitudes as easily as, or 
more easily than, the perception theory. Other evaluative presentation theories 
include the theory that emotions are judgments (see Robert C. Solomon, 
“Emotion and Choice,” in Explaining Emotions, ed. Amélie O. Rorty (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 257-258) and the theory that 
emotions present their objects as falling under a “paradigm scenario” and 
thus make that object salient to the subject’s attention (Ronald de Sousa, The 
Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 201-202).
53  Christine Tappolet, Emotions, Values, and Agency (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 13, 15-16.
54  D’Arms and Jacobson, “The Moralistic Fallacy,” 66-67; Tappolet, 
Emotions, 20.
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as fearsome and yet know that it is not fearsome. Emotions can 
nonetheless be seen as epistemic attitudes on the perception 
theory in the broad sense of attitudes that are relevant to 
epistemic commitments. Tappolet claims that emotions are 
reasons for beliefs in the same way visual experiences are: if we 
perceive fearsomeness in something, this is a prima facie reason 
to believe that it is fearsome.55 This means that emotions are 
relevant to knowledge and are thus epistemic attitudes in the 
broad sense. Moreover, fittingness is an epistemic norm – fitting 
emotions are reasons for correct beliefs, and unfitting emotions 
are reasons for incorrect beliefs. 
Fitting emotions about civilian casualties, on this view, 
lead Americans to correct beliefs and thus have the same moral-
epistemic and political benefits as correct beliefs. Outrage 
about a civilian casualty gives Americans a prima facie reason to 
believe that the casualty is outrageous. Outrage about civilian 
casualties should therefore be cultivated insofar as civilian 
casualties are outrageous, and insofar as believing a casualty 
to be outrageous can lead subjects to other correct beliefs, such 
as “the casualty was a terrible injustice”. Similarly, unfitting 
emotions like joy are prima facie reasons to form incorrect beliefs 
like the belief that a casualty is joyous, and so there are benefits 
to cultivating more fitting emotions. While the reason joy gives 
is firmly overruled by basic moral considerations of the value of 
human life, such considerations may not sway certain people, 
and replacing joy with a more fitting emotion might bring them 
to have correct beliefs. This indicates that emotions and beliefs 
have similar importance for my question, and I will speak of 
them concurrently as epistemic attitudes.56, 57
55  Tappolet, Emotions, 40.
56  This is not the only way to bring about correct beliefs about civilian 
casualties, for one can have unfitting emotions about a casualty and still 
acknowledge it as deeply wrong. Nonetheless, attempting to cultivate fitting 
emotions in Americans will give them reasons to change their beliefs, and 
might thereby cause some of them to do so.
57  Fitting emotions might also have distinctive political benefits 
due to their greater capacity to motivate action than beliefs. Because I am 
discussing emotions as epistemic attitudes, however, it is best to conceive of 
their benefits as coming from knowledge, rather than motivation. I will thus 
see fitting emotions’ political benefits as I do the benefits of correct beliefs 
- actions which follow from people knowing how morally troubling civilian 
casualties are. Nonetheless, investigating which strategies should be used to 
motivate political action, and whether these differ from those I propose in this 
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I will count absences of emotion as emotions. Thus, 
if a civilian casualty is outrageous and someone is apathetic 
in the face of it, their emotion is unfitting insofar as they are 
not perceiving the property of outrageousness. This is not a 
theoretical claim, for I do not think that absences of emotion 
are emotions, particularly assuming a perception theory on 
which emotions must perceive properties. It is rather a matter of 
convenience, insofar as not having a fitting emotion can inhibit 
people from acquiring correct beliefs about casualties in the 
same way that having an unfitting emotion “proper” like joy 
can. While the latter has more potential for distortion insofar as 
it gives an active reason to form an incorrect belief, some people 
might not consider casualties outrageous unless they have the 
prima facie reason outrage gives them. For such people, having 
no emotion can inhibit them from reaching correct beliefs 
insofar as it inhibits them from feeling outrage, and in this sense 
their absences of emotion are “unfitting emotions”.
Medina defines meta-blindness as a subject’s epistemic 
blindness with respect to their first-order epistemic attitudes.58 
First-order epistemic attitudes are about something that is not 
an epistemic attitude – for example, the belief that the earth is 
round. Second-order epistemic attitudes are about a subject’s 
own first-order epistemic attitudes – for example, A’s belief 
that A’s belief that the earth is round is correct. Meta-blindness 
always involves first-order epistemic attitudes about features of 
one’s social world, and second-order epistemic attitudes which 
are incorrect attitudes towards those first-order attitudes.59 
One could have first-order attitudes of incorrect beliefs about 
others (such as not knowing the difference between Shia and 
Sunni Islam), and a second-order attitude which is an incorrect 
belief about one’s first-order beliefs (such as thinking that one’s 
beliefs cover every part of the social world). The first-order 
attitude could also be affective, such as a lack of concern for 
the suffering of Muslims.60 Meta-blindness would here lie in an 
incorrect second-order belief about this lack of concern, such 
paper, would undoubtedly be of interest.
58  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 149.
59  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 75, 149.
60  Medina sees epistemic attitudes as “hybrid… cognitive-affective 
attitudes”, but does not defend this or elaborate on what it entails (José 
Medina, “Racial Violence, Emotional Friction, and Epistemic Activism,” 
Angelaki 24, no. 4 (2019): 25).
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as thinking that one is not wrong for lacking concern because 
the situation does not warrant concern. While the second-order 
attitudes could be affective (feeling concerned or unconcerned 
about one’s first-order attitudes), only cognitive second-order 
attitudes are required for my analysis.61
First-order blindness refers to first-order epistemic 
attitudes that are incorrect beliefs or unfitting emotions. I will, 
following Medina, refer to both of these as “insensitivities”, 
because it best captures the epistemic attitudes that are 
the focus of my paper.62 I will also refer to them as “first-
order insensitivities”, even though I do not use the term 
“second-order insensitivity”, in order to distinguish them 
from meta-blindness. Insensitivities could be cognitive, 
such as thinking a civilian casualty isn’t morally wrong, or 
affective, such as not feeling outrage at a needless casualty. 
Conversely, “sensitivities’ are correct beliefs or fitting emotions. 
Correctness and fittingness of beliefs and emotions come 
on a scale, so sometimes I will speak of attitudes as more or 
less sensitive than one another, rather than as “sensitivities” 
and “insensitivities”.  Beliefs and emotions about civilian 
casualties can be concerned – such as the belief that a casualty 
is unjust and outrage at a needless casualty –- or unconcerned. 
“Concern” and “unconcern” do not determine whether an 
attitude is correct or fitting – a concerned or unconcerned 
attitude could, depending on how the world is, be an 
insensitivity or a sensitivity. I have, however, assumed that the 
world is such that Americans coming to have more concern 
about civilian casualties is a moral-epistemic improvement.
Medina defines “meta-attitudes” as epistemic attitudes 
about one’s epistemic attitudes.63 Meta-attitudes could take 
many shapes, such as attitudes about one’s epistemic abilities.64 
For example, epistemic arrogance places undue credence in 
one’s beliefs, and an undue lack of credence in contradictory 
beliefs.65 Meta-attitudes influence epistemic life in several 
ways. For example, they determine which attitudes one takes 
seriously, and which are dismissed without consideration.66 
61  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 81.
62  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 89.
63  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 58. It is plausible to see meta-
blindness as itself a meta-attitude, but this is irrelevant to my argument.
64  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 58
65  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 31.
66  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 212.
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For example, epistemic arrogance leads people to dismiss 
anything which conflicts with their current attitudes.67 Meta-
attitudes also influence epistemic life by determining which 
epistemic attitudes a subject seeks out, and what subjects count 
as justification.68 Meta-attitudes can be beneficial as well as 
harmful – e- empiricism is a beneficial meta-attitude that places 
higher credence in attitudes for which there is evidence.
Moira Gatens defines the social imaginary as the 
“background” of “imaginings” by which individuals in a 
society can understand one another, with these imaginings 
including things like images and scripts.69 The social imaginary 
consists of many different imaginaries, some of which are 
dominant imaginaries such as the patriarchal imaginary and 
the white imaginary.70 When something falls outside dominant 
social imaginaries, it is “unimaginable” from within them.71 
Medina analyses how in To Kill a Mockingbird, “black pity 
for white subjects” and “a white girl coming on to” a black 
man are shown to be unimaginable within the dominant 
white imaginary of Jim Crow Alabama. Instead, the script of 
this imaginary read that black people “have a sexual agency 
out of control whereas white women lack sexual agency”.72 
Imaginaries can also influence affective life, for example by 
rendering one unable to experience sympathy for people who 
are dehumanised by the imaginary’s scripts.73
67  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 31-33.
68  Medina Epistemology of Resistance, 212.
69  Moira Gatens, “Imaginaries,” in 50 Concepts for a Critical 
Phenomenology, eds. Gail Weiss, Ann V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2019), 183; Charles Taylor, 
Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), 
165, quoted in Gatens, “Imaginaries,” 183; Medina, Epistemology of 
Resistance, 67 n. 4.
70  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 78.
71  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 67-68.
72  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 67-68.
73  A relevant feature of social imaginaries is that they can be 
“internalized” by subjects, and can thus influence one’s beliefs and emotions 
even if one’s conscious beliefs refute the imaginary (Medina, Epistemology of 
Resistance, 269). Someone in Jim Crow Alabama who consciously believed 
that white people are not superior to black people could nonetheless be 
biased towards thinking that black people do not feel pity for white people. 
This is the well-known phenomenon of “implicit bias”. See Jennifer Saul, 
68
Subjects’ beliefs and emotions are not completely 
determined by dominant social imaginaries, for there are what 
Medina calls “alternative social imaginaries”.74 For example, 
the black imaginary within Jim Crow Alabama challenged the 
script of the white imaginary insofar as black people recognised 
the incorrectness of the white imaginary’s racist stereotypes.75 
People may come to inhabit different imaginaries, and thus be 
able to imagine what was previously unimaginable to them.76 
Nonetheless, since dominant imaginaries render many contents 
of other imaginaries unintelligible, entering other imaginaries is 
challenging for subjects under dominant imaginaries.77 Hereon, 
I will use “epistemic structures” to refer to both imaginaries and 
meta-attitudes.
2. The Insensitivity of American Citizens to Civilian 
Casualties
Having outlined the concepts of meta-blindness, meta-
attitudes, and the social imaginary, I am now in a position to 
analyse American citizens’ insensitivity to civilian casualties 
in terms of this framework. After going over part of the 
empirical evidence for Americans’ insensitivity, I will present 
Tirman’s case for orientalism and the frontier myth causing this 
insensitivity, noting that both are dominant social imaginaries. 
I will then present Tirman’s case for orientalist knowledge 
hierarchies causing insensitivity, noting that they are meta-
attitudes. Finally, I will argue that the influence of these 
epistemic structures would cause Americans to be meta-blind. 
The implications of this analysis for how insensitivity should be 
combatted will be presented in the next section.
Tirman presents empirical evidence for Americans’ 
insensitivity to civilian casualties, although notes that there 
is little survey data on this topic, which he claims is “itself a 
symptom” of indifference.78 I will present Tirman’s evidence 
for insensitivity to civilian casualties in the wars in Iraq, since 
“Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Epistemic Injustice,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, ed. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile 
Pohlhaus (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 235-242.
74  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 78.
75  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 78.
76  Medina, “Racial Violence,” 31.
77  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 71.
78  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 338.
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these wars feature later in my paper. Analysing public polling, 
Tirman claims that “American casualties and achievement of 
war aims tend to be the key variables of popularity, not local 
impact”, which reflects indifference towards civilian casualties.79 
Tirman identifies that the public sphere also reflected 
indifference: “few major politicians… expressed compassion for 
the Iraqis’ suffering; no major religious figures came forward 
with calls to help the victims of violence…; editorials about Iraq 
in major newspapers rarely mentioned civilian casualties”.80 
Tirman doesn’t specify which epistemic attitudes are reflected 
in the public polling, but his description of the public sphere’s 
reaction indicates that Americans’ insensitivity involves both 
beliefs about the moral seriousness of civilian casualties and 
emotions directed towards those casualties. Tirman gives 
several causes of this insensitivity: government narratives, 
psychological defence mechanisms, orientalism, and the frontier 
myth.81 The latter two will be the focus of my analysis, because 
they most clearly demonstrate why Americans are meta-blind.
Tirman identifies both orientalism and the frontier myth 
as causes of American insensitivity, and while Tirman doesn’t 
use this term, both are dominant imaginaries. Margaret Kohn 
and Kavita Reddy define Edward Said’s concept of orientalism 
as referring to “a structured set of concepts, assumptions, and 
discursive practices” prevalent during colonial Europe “that 
were used to produce, interpret, and evaluate knowledge 
about non-European peoples”.82 These assumptions included 
associating negative traits with non-European people, with 
Said giving the example of seeing “the Arab” “as an oversexed 
degenerate,… sadistic, treacherous, low.”83 Said also identifies 
79  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 339. His analysis is that several 
polls from 2007 to 2009 showed a majority supported American withdrawal 
from Iraq, even though a majority believed such withdrawal would lead to 
Iraqi civilians being more vulnerable to attacks by insurgents. On the other 
hand, Operation Desert Storm’s public support went from 50% to 80% as the 
American military began to see success.
80  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 340.
81  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 342-359.
82  Margaret Kohn and Kavita Reddy, “Colonialism,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 edition), edited by Edward 
N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.
cgi?entry=colonialism; Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 344.
83  Edward W. Said, Orientalism (Vintage, 1979), 278-9, quoted in 
Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 345.
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that Arab people are not seen in their specificity as human 
beings under orientalism: “The Arab is always shown in 
large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics 
or experiences”.84 Tirman identifies that these orientalist 
assumptions have underlain American attitudes towards the 
civilian populations of American wars, and have reinforced 
insensitivity.85 These populations have often been Asian and 
Arab populations who are subject to orientalist stereotypes. 
Furthermore, Tirman notes that American empire has been 
“based in part on a supposition of white superiority”, and that 
the American military has notably used such racial slurs as 
“gooks” and “hajis”.86 Orientalism is a social imaginary which 
Americans inhabit, since it is based on representations of Asian 
and Arab populations. Moreover, it is a dominant imaginary, 
insofar as non-orientalist imaginaries are less accessible to 
Americans than orientalist imaginaries.
This imaginary engenders insensitivity. In their research 
on Israeli citizens’ reactions to Palestinian civilians dying at the 
hands of Israeli forces, social psychologist Noa Schori-Eyal and 
collaborators found that viewing civilians harmed in war in 
dehumanising ways leads to perceiving them as less common 
with oneself.87 This, in turn, makes one more likely to tolerate 
harms to those civilians.88 Americans influenced by orientalism 
see civilians in derogatory and dehumanising ways, and are 
therefore less likely to form concerned attitudes about civilian 
casualties.
Tirman defines the frontier myth as a “set of ideas, 
myths, and self-identities” in which America is seen as having 
a “mission” of “taming… the wilderness” and the “savages” 
who live there.89 The earliest example of this in the public 
conscience is the violence European-American colonisers 
committed against Indigenous peoples, and Tirman claims 
84  Said, Orientalism, 278-9, quoted in Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 
345;
85  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 344
86  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 236, 344.
87  Noa Schori-Eyal, Eran Halperin, and Tamar Saguy, “Intergroup 
Commonality, Political Ideology, and Tolerance of Enemy Collateral 
Casualties in Intergroup Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 3 
(2019): 434.
88  Schori-Eyal, Halperin, and Saguy, “Intergroup Commonality,” 434.
89  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 350-351
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that the myth has underlain American global expansion.90 He 
identifies a particular conception of violence as central to this 
myth. Firstly, the violence is seen as “defensive” or “reactive”, 
responding to provocation from external forces (for example, to 
provocation from “Indian savagery”).91 Secondly, the violence 
is seen as “regenerative”, as reaffirming the “moral worth of 
its practitioner.” In the modern context, this takes the form 
of reaffirming “the natural rightness of Anglo-Saxon liberty”, 
among other things.92 
This is a dominant imaginary, and Tirman claims 
that it underlies American responses to civilian casualties 
and engenders insensitivity. While Tirman doesn’t label it as 
an imaginary, he notes it is deeply rooted in the American 
psyche and “powerfully shapes the attitudes and behaviour of 
Americans from childhood.”93 This imaginary structures how 
Americans see wars and the civilians in them, since American 
wars are often framed under the lenses of defensive and 
regenerative violence (for example, The Iraq War was seen as 
regeneration after “a period of softness” which had resulted, in 
this imaginary, in 9/11).94 This way of seeing wars engenders 
insensitivity. Tirman identifies that it creates a script on which 
civilians are not the focus, being rather “players in this drama” 
which is truly about America’s moral redemption.95 Americans’ 
reactions to civilian casualties are determined by this script, 
which stifles concern insofar as it accords no harm to civilians, 
or frames harms that do occur as justified insofar as they are 
defensive and regenerative.96
Tirman claims that another side of orientalism fosters 
insensitivity, namely hierarchies of knowledge which mediate 
90  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 350.
91  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 351. Tirman cites empirical 
evidence which shows that support for reactive violence among Americans 
is “positively correlated with the embrace of “frontier values”” (Tirman, 
The Deaths of Others, 352; James Shields and Leonard Weinberg, “Reactive 
Violence and the American Frontier: A Contemporary Evaluation,” Western 
92  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 351-352.
93  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 360.
94  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 353.
95  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 353.
96  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 354
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the way in which people in “The Orient” are understood.97 
These knowledge hierarchies are meta-attitudes. American 
orientalist knowledge hierarchies unduly privilege the 
American social sciences, such as historiography and 
international relations. These disciplines are thought to lead 
to “knowledge” of other cultures, while voices from those 
cultures “are not heard”, and “are discounted as… ignorant” 
on the rare occasions when they are heard (Tirman cites the 
US public’s reaction to the polls of Iraqi civilians).98 Such 
knowledge hierarchies constitute a meta-attitude about 
what counts as “knowledge” of these civilians, namely that 
“knowledge” of them does not come from their mouths, hearts, 
and bodies, but from American expertise. Tirman claims that 
these knowledge hierarchies engender American insensitivity 
because they makes it such that the American public “knows”, 
with “scientific veracity”, that foreign populations have traits 
which justify violence (for example, having “no appreciation 
for freedom”).99 This makes Americans see their unconcerned 
attitudes towards civilian casualties, that are in fact insensitive, 
as justified.
The preceding analyses indicate that American citizens 
are meta-blind because these citizens have epistemic structures 
which block epistemic counterpoints, and can avail themselves 
of several justifications for their cognitively and affectively 
insensitive attitudes.100 Medina calls epistemic attitudes 
that conflict with one’s own “epistemic counterpoints”.101 
The imaginaries of orientalism and the frontier myth 
inhibit Americans from experiencing such counterpoints by 
rendering concerned attitudes towards civilian casualties 
unimaginable. This unimaginability inhibits Americans from 
coming to concerned attitudes themselves, which might act as 
counterpoints to their other epistemic attitudes. For example, 
perhaps without the imaginary of orientalism an American 
might feel sympathy for the family of a civilian casualty, which 
97  While this could be analysed as part of the social imaginary of 
orientalism, I prefer to analyse the imaginary as involving imaginings, and I 
do not see knowledge ascription as an imagining.
98  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 345-346.
99  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 346-347
100  Medina gives arguments for why imaginaries and meta-attitudes 
generally cause meta-blindness, which I have drawn on for my specific 
claims here (Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 82, 149, 306).
101  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 70, 75.
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would challenge their belief that “that killing was, on balance, 
justified.” The unimaginability of sensitive attitudes can also 
distort Americans’ interpretations of epistemic counterpoints 
that others articulate. Imagine someone expresses the belief that 
a civilian casualty was unjust. Such concern is incompatible 
with the orientalist imaginary, so it might be distorted for 
someone living under that imaginary – they might see it as a 
mere expression of the speaker’s sadness about their day, rather 
than a claim about the world. Thus, the imaginaries preclude 
Americans from experiencing concerned attitudes (whether 
held by themselves or others) which would challenge their 
insensitivity. This makes them unable to acknowledge that their 
beliefs and emotions are insensitive, rendering them meta-
blind.
Even if Americans did experience epistemic 
counterpoints, however, their imaginaries and meta-attitudes 
would diminish the counterpoints’ ability to make them 
aware of their limitations. This is because these structures 
distort Americans’ judgments of which attitudes are sensitive 
and which insensitive. I have argued that knowledge 
hierarchies engender first-order insensitivity by justifying 
unconcerned attitudes, but this justification also entrenches 
meta-blindness by making Americans see their insensitive 
attitudes as sensitive.102 According to these meta-attitudes, 
unconcerned attitudes are correct or fitting since they accord 
with American “expertise” and are not blinded by “inferior” 
forms of knowledge. The imaginaries similarly justify 
unconcerned attitudes. The frontier myth renders unconcerned 
beliefs and emotions about civilian casualties sensitive, since 
they correctly respond to the properties of American moral 
regeneration, and are not blinded by considerations irrelevant 
to the expansion of the frontier. Deep concern is an insensitive 
attitude towards civilian casualties according to the orientalist 
imaginary, on which civilians are unworthy of respect and 
lack the individuality which might give special value to their 
lives. According to this imaginary, callous attitudes, rather 
than concerned ones, correctly perceive the properties of 
civilian casualties. Thus, these imaginaries and meta-attitudes 
make Americans see their unconcerned attitudes, which are 
insensitive, as sensitive. These are incorrect attitudes towards 
102  I am using “sensitive” in a technical sense here to mean correct 
belief or fitting emotion, and Americans would likely not describe their 
attitudes with this word. My point is that they see attitudes which are in fact 
incorrect beliefs or unfitting emotions as correct or fitting.
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their beliefs and emotions about civilian casualties, and thus 
constitute meta-blindness.
3. Combatting Insensitivity
I have claimed that American citizens are meta-blind 
with respect to their insensitivity to civilian casualties, and that 
this meta-blindness is rooted in the dominant imaginaries of 
orientalism and the frontier myth, as well as the meta-attitudes 
of orientalist knowledge hierarchies. I will now show how 
this analysis suggests ways in which insensitivity should be 
combatted. I will first outline two seemingly intuitive strategies 
for combatting insensitivity, which do not target meta-blindness 
or background epistemic structures: highlighting insensitivity 
and presenting sensitive attitudes. I will then argue that 
such strategies are inadequate, and background epistemic 
structures and meta-blindness must be directly targeted. I will 
suggest strategies that directly target each of these. Epistemic 
structures can be challenged by utilising different imaginaries 
and meta-attitudes, while meta-blindness can be challenged by 
engendering comparison of different epistemic perspectives. 
I will give concrete examples of these strategies from the 
MoMA’s exhibition “Theater of Operations: The Gulf Wars 
1991-2011”.103
An intuitive way of combatting American insensitivity 
focuses on first-order insensitive attitudes without regard to 
their background epistemic structures or Americans’ meta-
blindness. Two strategies which do this are highlighting 
insensitivity and presenting sensitive attitudes. Imagine that 
someone expresses a callous attitude towards a civilian casualty 
like “their life wasn’t worth much”. Highlighting insensitivity 
involves telling the speaker that what they said was insensitive, 
for example by saying “that’s quite callous of you”. Presenting 
a sensitive attitude involves exhibiting a concerned attitude 
towards the casualties, for example saying “that attack was 
horrific”.
103  I have not seen this exhibition in person, and my knowledge of it 
is from the following sources: “Theater of Operations: The Gulf Wars 1991-
2011,” MoMA, accessed June 10, 2020, https://www.moma.org/calendar/
exhibitions/5084; Tim Arango and Jason Farago, “These Artists Refuse 
to Forget the Wars in Iraq,” New York Times, November 14, 2019; Neil 
MacFarquhar, “Mourning Iraq’s Destruction, a Native Son Creates,” New 
York Times, December 31, 2019; Eleni Zaras, “New York City’s MoMA PS1 
“Gulf Wars” Exhibition Caught in Crossfire,” The Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs 39, no. 3 (2020): 48-50.
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These methods, while effective to some extent, are 
insufficient as a complete strategy for combatting American 
insensitivity, since forms of insensitivity may remain in 
the face of such challenges unless epistemic structures and 
meta-blindness are directly targeted. If Americans’ epistemic 
structures are not targeted, the challenges identified above 
will often be unimaginable or unjustified to them. As 
previously identified, Americans often interpret sensitive 
attitudes incorrectly due to the imaginaries’ distortions. 
Even if sensitive attitudes can be correctly interpreted, they 
might be written off as insensitive since meta-attitudes and 
imaginaries distort judgments of sensitivity and insensitivity. 
Similarly, highlighting insensitivity might be ineffective, as 
the insensitive subject might think that their attitude is not 
insensitive – they’re not callous, they’re having a clear-thinking 
reaction to a justified killing. Because of these ways in which 
insensitivities can remain in the face of first-order challenges to 
insensitivity, orientalism and the frontier myth must be directly 
targeted. Because I analysed them as imaginaries and meta-
attitudes, I can avail myself of Medina’s strategy for combatting 
such epistemic structures. This is the strategy of challenging 
epistemic structures from different epistemic structures that 
Americans may access.
Recall that subjects in dominant imaginaries are 
not wholly stuck there, but can enter different imaginaries. 
Alternative social imaginaries can challenge the dominant 
one.104 For example, perhaps certain American citizens can 
enter a pacifist imaginary and see the world through its 
lens. This might lead them to outrage at civilian casualties. 
Nonetheless, alternative imaginaries might be inaccessible to 
one who is stuck within a dominant imaginary that renders 
the contents of alternative imaginaries unimaginable or 
unjustified. The frontier myth renders it unimaginable that 
peace could be sustained, because that would end the frontier 
myth.105 Therefore, subjects who inhabit the frontier myth 
might be unable to inhabit a pacifist imaginary. This means that 
resistance from within a different dominant imaginary could be 
necessary.106 For example, Dia al-Azzawi’s painting “Mission of 
Destruction” directly challenges the frontier myth by drawing 
104  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 257
105  Tirman, The Deaths of Others, 366.
106  Medina “Racial violence”, 32-33.
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on Picasso’s “Guernica” (American troops are on the right, 
Iraqis on the left):107
Dia al-Azzawi, “Mission of Destruction”
“Guernica” is not a dominant imaginary in American 
society as a whole, but it is in the context of a modern art 
gallery. This painting uses this imaginary to frame American 
troops not as saviours or as engaging in regenerative violence, 
but as engaging in violence equivalent to the horrifying 
violence of “Guernica”. This uses a different dominant 
imaginary which people in the art gallery inhabit (“Guernica”) 
to challenge the frontier myth. 
Similar strategies can be used to challenge meta-
attitudes. Challenges can come from meta-attitudes the subject 
doesn’t currently possess, but can come to possess, such as 
meta-attitudes which privilege local knowledge over American 
“expertise”. Alternatively, challenges can come from a different 
meta-attitude the subject currently possesses, for example using 
the meta-attitude of empiricism to challenge the meta-attitude 
of privileging American expertise, as this expertise gets things 
empirically wrong (for example, being wrong about what 
will be politically stabilising). Thus, combatting Americans’ 
107  MacFarquhar, “Mourning Iraq’s Destruction.”
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insensitivity requires directly targeting background epistemic 
structures, and my analysis of their insensitivity suggests 
doing this by challenging Americans’ epistemic structures from 
different epistemic structures they can access.
Combatting insensitivity to civilian casualties also 
requires targeting meta-blindness directly. Combatting 
meta-blindness involves creating an awareness of first-order 
insensitivities.108 For Americans, this would be an awareness 
of their inability to have certain beliefs about and affective 
attitudes towards civilian casualties. In order to ensure that 
Americans overcome insensitivities in new contexts that 
generate new insensitivities, Americans must be vigilant about 
checking their epistemic limitations and seeking out alternative 
perspectives that might correct those limitations. These 
habits can be fostered by combatting meta-blindness to make 
them aware that they have limitations. It might be that some 
level of awareness of limitations is achieved by highlighting 
insensitivities and presenting sensitivities, since one might 
become humbler upon being corrected. This is by no means 
guaranteed, however. We should therefore consider strategies 
which try to directly combat meta-blindness.
The strategy Medina proposes for combatting meta-
blindness is encouraging people to compare different epistemic 
perspectives with their own.109 Through a comparison of 
sensitive and insensitive perspectives on civilian casualties, 
insensitive subjects can become more aware of their epistemic 
limitations. If an American compares their perspective on 
civilian casualties with an Iraqi’s, the more concerned attitudes 
in the latter than in the former are highlighted. The American 
might thereby realise that such concern is sensitive, and their 
absence of concern is insensitive.110 “Theater of Operations” 
encourages its audience to engage in such comparison. It 
contains works by both Western and non-Western artists, 
including artists from Iraq and Kuwait, allowing comparison 
not merely between cognitive perspectives, but affective ones as 
well, insofar as these perspectives are expressed in emotionally 
108  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 186-190.
109  Medina, Epistemology of Resistance, 199-201.
110  I acknowledge that this strategy is limited insofar as many of 
the perspectives presented for comparison with the American one will 
be distorted or rendered insensitive by Americans’ background epistemic 
structures. The two strategies I have proposed in this section should therefore 
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charged artworks.111 For example, many works focus on media 
representations of the Gulf War. Michel Auder’s “Gulf War TV 
War” plays footage from contemporary news broadcasts.112
Michel Auder, “Gulf War TV War”
These images depict the war as, in Tim Arango’s words, 
“a sanitized… war without a lot of casualties”.113 They convey 
the dominant epistemic perspective, and it is insensitive to 
civilian casualties. The work also conveys Auder’s perspective, 
which criticises the dominant perspective without showing 
what that perspective misses. Yet the exhibition also contains 
works from Iraqi artists which present sensitive attitudes that 
the dominant perspective misses. Hanaa Malallah’s “She/He 
Has No Picture” is a series of portraits of the victims of a US 
bomb strike that killed 400 people in the Amiriyah shelter.114
111  Arango and Farago, “These Artists Refuse to Forget,” and Zaras, 
“Exhibition Caught in Crossfire,” 48-50 mention this comparison of 
perspectives.
112  Arango and Farago, “These Artists Refuse to Forget”.
113  Arango and Farago, “These Artists Refuse to Forget”.
114  Arango and Farago, “These Artists Refuse to Forget”.
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Hanaa Malallah, “She/He Has No Picture”
The texture of these paintings is disrupted, making 
it seem like they are disintegrating. This disintegration is 
juxtaposed with the often lively, smiling faces, conveying a 
great sense of loss.115 Mallalah’s works mourns these casualties, 
and this is a sensitive attitude towards them. Considered alone, 
Auder’s work and Malallah’s highlight an insensitivity and 
present a sensitivity, respectively. The exhibition as a whole, 
however, allows for direct comparison of Malallah’s sensitive 
perspective with the perspective of the American media, 
promoting awareness of the absence of concern in the latter 
perspective. Viewers can also compare it with Auder’s critical 
perspective, seeing that Auder does not perceive what is missed 
by the dominant perspective and acknowledging this as a blind 
spot in Auder’s perspective.
4. Conclusion
American citizens are meta-blind with respect to 
their insensitivity to civilian casualties: they do not know 
that they are insensitive. Their insensitivity is rooted in the 
dominant social imaginaries of orientalism and the frontier 
myth, as well as in the meta-attitude of orientalist knowledge 
hierarchies. This means Americans are likely meta-blind, since 
these epistemic structures prevent them from engaging with 
epistemic counterpoints that would make them aware that they 
115  This analysis is inspired by John Farago’s in Arango and Farago, 
“These Artists Refuse to Forget”.
80
are insensitive, and distort their judgments of which attitudes 
are sensitive and which insensitive.
Identifying the role of imaginaries, meta-attitudes, and 
meta-blindness in American insensitivity has implications for 
how insensitivity should be combatted. Effectively combatting 
insensitivity requires directly targeting Americans’ meta-
blindness and their background epistemic structures. I thus 
suggest two strategies for combatting insensitivity –- comparing 
differing epistemic perspectives to combat meta-blindness, 
and using different epistemic structures Americans can access 
to challenge the epistemic structures of orientalism and the 
frontier myth.
I have provided a novel analysis of Americans’ 
insensitivity to civilian casualties, and suggested novel ways 
for combatting this insensitivity. The effectiveness of various 
strategies is not settled by the arguments I have presented, and 
interdisciplinary empirical work needs to be done to determine 
which strategies are the most effective. Finding the best strategy 
possible is necessary for producing the moral-epistemic 
and political benefits of combatting insensitivity to civilian 
casualties.
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